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For the large number of developing countries undergoing significant 
structural transformations, one of, the most important and controversial 
adjustment areas is that of financial markets. of the principal broad areas 
facing adjustment - which also include fiscal systems, labour markets, foreign 
trade regimes, investment incentives, and the agricultural sector - it may well 
be the most controversial and difficult market to transform. There is little 
consensus as to when you should liberalize your financial markets or how - indeed 
whether - it should be done. Even Ronald McKinnon, the most well-known proponent 
of financial liberalization, has somewhat reversed his position on the matter and 
sees it as one of the last steps in the sequence towards a market oriented 
economy. At the extreme are statements like those of John Williamson that you 
should liberalize your capital markets once you become developed.' 
Nevertheless, even if theoretically desirable, the choice of the policy 
maker rarely comes down to liberalize or not to liberalize financial markets. 
Some financial liberalization is often forced upon any country that is trying to 
"insert" itself in the global economy. Moreover, given the technological 
advances of recent decades and the trend towards globalization of markets, it has 
become increasingly difficult to isolate domestic financial markets from the 
outside. Therefore, at best the decision often boils down to how far a country 
goes, how fast, and in what sequence. 
The purpose of this paper is not to summarize the literature on sequencing 
and financial liberalization, nor to offer possible new insights into the debate. 
Our main objective is to try and delineate future lines of productive research 
which could be undertaken in the general area of the liberalization of financial 
markets in developing countries. Our emphasis will be on the interaction of 
financial liberalization, the development of financial instruments, and the role 
of the central bank. Our main hypothesis is that for any given country financial 
liberalization is likely to follow a sub-sequence within the larger sequencing 
of structural reforms. The given sub-sequence for any country will depend very 
much on the state of development of financial markets and instruments as well as 
the role ceded the central bank with regards to monetary policy and financial 
1 Stiglitz (1994) states that financial markets are 
significantly different than other markets and more prone to 
failure.. He then discusses seven key manifestations of market 
failure in the financial sector, which suggests that some amount of 
financial repression may be beneficial until very advanced stages 
of the development process. Gibson and Tsakalotos' (1994) survey 
also argues along similar lines. 
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regulation. Moreover, all three of these elements are very much interrelated.2 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will give a 
brief overview of the experiences of financial liberalization in developing 
countries in the last 20 years, and attempt to put this review in the context of 
both a sequence of adjustments and the available targets and instruments. 
Section III discusses theoretical developments in the area of financial markets, 
focusing on the supply of and demand for assets and the role of financial 
intermediaries. Section IV investigates the role of central banks more 
precisely. The conclusion contains a summary of the discussion and an attempt 
to bring more focus to the most profitable researchable issues. 
II. Country Experience, Sequencing. Targets and Instruments 
In this section we give a broad overview of the current debate on financial 
reform by focusing on country experiences, sequencing of reforms, and finally on 
the more specific question of targets and instruments. The first four sub- 
sections try to generalize the experiences of four different types of countries. 
The fifth looks at the question of sequencing, sub-sequences, and the nature of 
any generalizations. The sixth examines in greater depth the importance of the 
notions of targets and instruments for the discussion. 
Such a large number of countries have undergone some sort of financial 
liberalization in the last twenty years that it becomes almost impossible to try 
and categorize them. Nevertheless, we group some of the more important 
experiences in four different categories: (a) the (notoriously) famous Southern 
Cone experiences; (b) East Asia; (c) Sub-Saharan Africa; and (d) transition 
economies. The first two are separated largely due to the different 
macroeconomic situations in which, for the most part, financial liberalization 
took place. The last two are analyzed separately due to the very different 
institutional characteristics of their economies and financial markets vis-a-vis 
one another and the first two groups. 
IIa. The Southern Cone 
It would be difficult to find economic "experiments" which have had more 
disastrous results than the attempts at financial liberalization in the Southern 
2 This hypothesis suggests that until well along in the 
development process, the financial sector of a typical developing 
country will appear substantially different than its counterpart in 
a developed country. 
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Cone countries of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in the 1970s. The financial 
reforms in these countries were very wide-ranging, including elements of the 
following: interest rate liberalization, dismantling of quantitative and 
selective credit controls, reduction of reserve requirements and barriers to 
entry, deregulation, liberalization of capital flows, and the legalization of US 
dollar accounts and transactions.3 All three countries saw a strong increase in 
capital inflows due to high real interest rates which caused and were caused, in 
part, by an overshooting of the real exchange rate, coupled with a reluctance on 
the part of the government to devalue out of fear of fuelling inflation. Despite 
initial strong growth in financial assets, the end result was that the private 
financial systems ended up practically bankrupt and many banks were nationalized 
by the government. In fact, in all three countries the external debts incurred 
as a result of the liberalization were "nationalized" by the governments. The 
debt problems of all three countries, which continued for many years after the 
programs ended and are still substantial for (at least) Argentina, can be 
directly traced to these failed experiments. 
There has been a great deal of investigation of the failure of these 
programs, an analysis which is made substantially more difficult due to the fact 
that financial liberalization was only one aspect of a package of reforms of 
which trade liberalization was perhaps the most important. More importantly, 
financial reform took place in the middle of attempts at macroeconomic 
stabilization. While it is notoriously difficult to separate out the effects of 
a stabilization versus adjustment package, in the Southern Cone case the 
consensus is that this is not so complex. In the 1990s, most observers agree 
that it is very difficult to try to financially open up an unstable economy.' 
Given the underlying financial repression, financial liberalization, almost 
by definition, means that there will be a rise in real interest rates. In an 
unstable macroeconomic setting this has two important consequences. First, as 
the instability is usually associated with (if not caused by) a large fiscal 
deficit, higher real interest rates will enlarge this deficit by increasing the 
cost of the government's domestic debt. Moreover, as the size of the monetary 
base will usually diminish as people switch portfolios to hitherto forbidden 
assets, the inflation tax will decline. Second, firms, many of whom are already 
3 See Zahler (1991) for one of many analyses of these 
experiments. For detailed analysis of the more recent experiences 
in financial liberalization of a number of South American 
countries, see Frenkel (1994). 
4 See, for example, the analyses of Cho and Khatkhate (1989), 
Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Zahler (1991), McKinnon (1991), and 
Fischer and Reisen (1992). 
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in a precarious condition due to the poor macroeconomic situation, will go 
bankrupt more readily, leading to a further deterioration of the economy as well 
as the bad debt portfolio of commercial banks. In the Southern Cone experience 
the commercial banks were next on their way to bankruptcy and were, thus, bailed 
out by the governments at enormous expense. 
In sum, while there are undoubtedly many other reasons for the Southern 
Cone fiasco, it seems clear that financial liberalization in the three countries 
added to the macroeconomic instability and thus led to its own downfall. It is 
worth noting that in other countries, as diverse as Turkey and Indonesia, 
attempts at financial liberalization during unstable macroeconomic times have led 
to very high real interest rates and similar, if less devastating, results. 
Nevertheless, we still must ask ourselves if this is a general rule for the 
future. Given that in the short 10 to 15 years since these experiments ended, 
the nature of domestic and international financial markets has been so radically 
transformed, it is not entirely obvious that this lesson is still valid. For 
example, even many countries which are or were officially closed to international 
capital flows are receiving them in a substantial manner. Moreover, many 
economies have become partially dollarized. Therefore, it is not quite as clear 
as previously that you will get such large, potentially destabilizing portfolio 
shifts from financial liberalization. For example, the fairly broad financial 
liberalization in Peru in the early 1990s has not met the Southern Cone fate 
despite substantial macroeconomic instability. Velarde and Rodriguez (1992) 
attribute this result to the widespread use of dollar accounts and large amounts 
of illegal capital flows. 
IIb. East Asia5 
The East Asian experience with financial reform only appears good when 
compared to the Southern Cone disasters. Although, with the possible exception 
of the Philippines, there have been no tremendous catastrophes of the magnitude 
of the South American countries, success has also been quite modest at best. It 
appears to be an open question whether the success obtained was a result or a 
cause of the fast growth in many of these economies. It could even be argued 
that the good performance relative to the Southern Cone was primarily due to the 
more stable macroeconomic settings, rather than the results of the reforms 
themselves. In fact, in the two countries which attempted to liberalize 
financial markets in an unstable macroeconomic situation - the Philippines and 
5 In East Asia we include the non-socialist and non-transition 
economies of Asia to the east of India and Bangladesh with the 
exclusion of Japan but inclusion of Sri Lanka. 
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Indonesia - the results were similar to the Southern Cone countries.6 
The rest of East Asia, except South Korea, suffered from large increases 
in real interest rates without the benefits of either an increase in the 
availability of long-term capital or a decrease in interest rate spreads. Cho 
and Khatkhate (1989) emphasize the importance of oligopolistic market structures 
- also important in the Southern Cone - which helped prevent any fall in the 
spreads. This brings us to a general problem of financial reform: it is often 
vital but difficult to introduce competition into the system. Old banks from the 
financial repression era are likely to be saddled with a large portfolio of bad 
debts, mostly steered their way by the government. Consequently, they cannot 
compete with foreign banks or new domestic banks, the introduction of which could 
endanger the entire financial system. At the same time, without the injection 
of a healthy dose of competition, financial liberalization may only result in 
massive income distribution and portfolios shifts without any significant real 
effects. 
South Korea is considered to be the one definite success story of this 
group of countries in the area of financial reform. There are at least two 
principal reasons for this result. First, reform was undertaken very slowly. 
While real interest rates were allowed to become positive, they were kept at 
rates just above inflation. Second, it was only until more than ten years of 
financial reform had passed that very tough restrictions on capital flows began 
to be relaxed. The recent World Bank (1993) report on the East Asian miracle 
emphasizes that the next step in South Korean development is in the area of 
financial markets. 
Once again, the East Asian experience forces us to reiterate two 
fundamental questions on the matter. First, does financial liberalization lead 
to growth, or vice-versa? Second, in an era of ever-increasing capital mobility, 
can experiences such as South Korea's be generalized to other countries with 
different historical and cultural backgrounds? 
IIc. Sub-Saharan Africa 
We have included Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a separate area because, for 
b See Cho and Khatkhate (1989), Faruqi (1993), or Tseng and 
Corker (1991) for in-depth analyses of financial reform in East 
Asia. The latter article puts particular emphasis on the conduct 
of monetary policy in the context of financial liberalization. The 
World Bank (1993) report on the "East Asian Miracle" emphasizes 
enormously the role of macroeconomic stability for the success of 
other policies in the region. 
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the most part, it is a region of very shallow and/or repressed financial markets. 
Consequently, its problems with respect to financial reform tend to be of a 
different order or magnitude than inmost other regions. In most countries in 
SSA the choice of financial assets is very limited, government bonds are of the 
forced savings variety, and (at least until recently) capital flows are highly 
restricted. On the other hand, you rarely find the extreme macroeconomic 
instability which has been characteristic of many Latin American countries.' 
Nevertheless, fiscal budgets are often highly dependent on the proceeds of 
financial repression and a large part of the total credit is directed to 
particular industries or sectors. 
Financial liberalization in SSA countries often needs to be centred on two 
factors. First, there is an essential need to create new financial instruments; 
ie financial deepening writ large. For example, any attempt at capital account 
liberalization without the previous development of at least a small range of 
alternatives can only lead to massive outflows. (In section III we more 
explicitly address the distinction between supply- or demand-driven financial 
assets.) Second, the ramifications for the fiscal deficit must be explicitly 
addressed. In fact, it may often be the case that financial reform is impossible 
unless preceded by a major fiscal reform. The difficulty of either one of these 
tasks is enormous. E1 Nil (1992) argues that any financial reform in SSA has to 
be extremely flexible and non-dogmatic. It should not be on a definite 
timetable, only move as fast as events allow. Moreover, he argues that due to 
the pressures on the fiscal deficit, it is likely that substantial external 
support will be necessary at the beginning.8 
IId. Transition Economies 
Given the caveats noted in the previous subsections with regards to 
financial liberalization - that is, the need for macroeconomic stability and 
institutional development - it may seem somewhat facetious to speak of the matter 
in the context of a transition economy. Where are the financial markets that are 
to be liberalized and upon what property rights are they based? If these exist, 
the macroeconomic situation is often so fragile that it is impossible to move on 
7 See the book from the African Centre for Monetary Studies 
(1992) for a discussion of the problems of financial reform in 
Africa along with a number of case studies. 
8 The more specific problems of monetary unions are discussed 
in the section on central banking. For a measure of the fiscal and 
other impacts of excessively controlled credit allocation systems 
(in the case of the franc zone) see Medhora (1992 and 1993a). 
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this front. Nevertheless, attempts are being made to reform and create financial 
markets in transition economies. Such reforms face different problems and 
urgencies than in other developing countries. 
Although the policy maker's preference may well be to keep financial reform 
on the backburner, he or she is often driven by other considerations, especially 
the need for foreign capital. In order to attract the large capital injections 
needed in most transition economies, it is often necessary to open up the capital 
account. This implies that in order to retain domestic savings, domestic 
financial markets must be liberalized to some extent. Along with weak 
institutions, the country has all the risks mentioned previously, such as very 
high real interest rates and overshooting of the exchange rate.9 
In general, however, the problem of financial liberalization in a 
transition economy is of quite a different nature than in other developing 
countries. This is a direct consequence of the structure of financial 
intermediation in the socialist era. The vast majority of credit was directed 
from the (nationalized) commercial banks to the firms. Many, if not most, of 
these firms need either to be closed or massively restructured. Moreover, due 
to large amounts of inter-firm arrears, bankruptcy of individual firms can easily 
have a domino effect, with the result being that the central bank is forced to 
refinance insolvent firms or face even greater macroeconomic instability. As 
firms are privatized, the number of bad loans in a typical bank's portfolio 
increases correspondingly. Consequently, in order to avoid bankruptcy 
themselves, many banks have to support "bankrupt" firms with new lines of credit. 
If the banks are privatized, they will quickly go under due to the large 
portfolio of bad loans. Attempts to instill competition into the banking system 
via new banks will result in a very uneven playing field.10 
IIe. Seauencincr 
There is a large and growing literature on the optimal sequencing of 
structural adjustment reforms." Before entering the sequencing debate, three 
9 See Fanelli and McMahon (1994), Perotti (1994), or Caprio 
and Levine (1994) for a discussion of the difficulties of financial 
liberalization in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and 
Russia. 
10 See Levine and Scott (1993) for a discussion of the bad loan 
problem of East European transition economies. 
11 See, for example, McKinnon (1991) and Fanelli and Frenkel 
(1992). 
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points should be made. First, as emphasized by Fanelli and Frenkel (1992), while 
it may be theoretically convenient, it rarely is practical to distinguish between 
stabilization and adjustment, as in unstable economies they usually depend on one 
another. Second, in some markets and in some circumstances there may be a sub- 
sequence of adjustments. We think that this is particularly true for financial 
markets, where reform has to be integrated with the general development of the 
economy and its institutions or the country could be exposed to very high and 
unnecessary risk. 12 This suggests that it may be necessary to discuss 
sequencing of financial reforms both in terms of where they fit in the grand 
scheme of things, as well as the optimal sequence of financial reforms 
themselves. Third, financial reforms can have very large distributional effects. 
Therefore, reforms which seem technically desirable may not be possible for 
political economy and/or income distribution grounds. 
The discussion in the preceding sub-sections points to a gradualist 
approach to financial reform in contrast to a "big bang" .13 In the subsection 
on transition economies, however, it was also indicated that at times you may 
have to run despite a lack of proper "conditioning". The discussion also 
indicates a sceptical attitude towards any uniform or formulistic approach to the 
sub-sequence of financial reforms. These will depend very much on the existing 
institutional regime, how easily it can be developed or adapted, the sequence of 
other reforms, the convergence of financial reform with these other reforms, the 
role and importance of monetary policy, and the path followed by the basic 
macroeconomic equilibria.14 At best, we hope that some generalizations can be 
made about the reforms needed in countries at similar levels of development and 
that those lagging behind can learn from the experience of their predecessors. 
12 See Leite and Sundararajan (1990), Roe and Popiel (1987), 
or Wong (1991) for three possible sequences of financial reforms. 
In a closely related area - at least for countries dependent on 
financial repression and inflation taxes - McMahon and Schmidt- 
Hebbel (1994) argue along similar lines with respect to fiscal 
reform. 
13 Note that we are not arguing for or against a big bang in 
the sense of opening up a broad front of reforms at the same time. 
We are suggesting that to date the evidence and professional 
consensus is leaning towards a cautious introduction of the series 
of financial reforms which would be desirable in a new equilibrium. 
14 For example, if financial liberalization leads to an 
(overshooting) exchange rate appreciation due to capital inflows, 
then governments which are net international debtors will find 
their fiscal positions improving at the same time as their current 
accounts deteriorate. The relative magnitudes of these swings 
could dictate the next moves in the reform process. 
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The debate on the correct sequencing of financial reforms cannot avoid the 
even more complex one on whether finance leads development, or is a result of 
development. We suspect that the answer to this question may also be country- 
specific and not generalizable over time for a given country. That is, as a. 
country progresses, it will eventually reach a point where particular financial 
reforms.are necessary before it can advance much further. 
IIf. Targets and Instruments 
In the preceding discussion we have focused almost exclusively on the 
direct role of financial liberalization in the investment, savings, and growth 
processes, with only slight reference to its indirect role via monetary policy. 
However, as liberalization progresses, the nature of both, the instruments and 
targets, of monetary policy changes along with the financial system. On one hand 
liberalization opens up new possibilities for government management or regulation 
of the financial sector (and, indirectly, the economy). On the other hand, it 
gives citizens more room to manoeuvre with regards to their own portfolios, and, 
hence, their collective behaviour is harder to control. That is, the brave new 
world open to monetary policy makers may be of little consequence if they are not 
able to use their new instruments to reach specific targets. Tseng and Corker 
(1991) catalogue the difficulties which faced Asian policy makers during periods 
of financial liberalization both with regards to defining desirable targets (as 
monetary aggregates shifted and often became very unstable) as well as using 
their new tools to reach these targets. 
Financial liberalization, especially in its most extreme form in the 
context of a small open economy, may well diminish the role of monetary policy 
to the relatively minor one (from a historical perspective) of maintaining low 
inflation and, perhaps, a stable real exchange rate. For example, by eliminating 
credit rationing and opening up foreign capital flows, the interest rate becomes 
very much tied to international rates and the monetary authorities lose a 
historically important channel of selective intervention. Of course, the way all 
of this will play out in practice will depend very much on the new role ascribed 
to the central bank, as discussed in Section IV. 
Finally, we conclude this section by emphasizing that what are instruments 
to monetary policy makers are very much financial assets to wealth holders. The 
types and variety of such assets will have important effects on portfolio shifts, 
including capital flows and dollarization. Hence, they can play a stabilizing 
or destabilizing role, depending on the source of any shock to the economy. 
Damill and Fanelli (1988) argue that in order to understand the effects of 
monetary policy, particular attention has to be paid to the manner in which 
private agents, not just governments, finance their deficits. For example, in 
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Argentina in the early 1980s the credit squeeze was partially avoided by large 
firms borrowing abroad and then lending to smaller firms.15 While Roe and 
Popiel (1987) argue that financial deepening is one of the most important factors 
in dampening the response of a country to external shocks, McNelis and Schmidt- 
Hebbel (1992) emphasize that bad domestic policies will have stronger 
repercussions in an economy with liberalized financial markets. 
III. Asset Markets and Financial Intermediation 
This section places the issue of financial liberalization in LDCs in the 
context of developments in the relevant aspects of the literature on asset 
markets and financial intermediation. Although the aim of this project is 
practical and policy-oriented, the need for sound theoretical underpinnings of 
policy analysis and advice is self-evident. Still, the idea here is not to 
present a series of lectures on financial economics, but rather, to situate 
financial liberalization in LDCs in the larger literature on the functioning of 
financial markets and players. 
Three broad areas of enquiry may be delineated - the supply of assets, the 
demand for assets, and the intermediation that brings about equilibrium. 
IIIa. The Supply of Assets 
The distinction made in this section between asset supply and asset demand 
is somewhat forced. In fact, the bulk of the debate and intellectual advances 
have been concentrated on the demand side - specifically, on perspectives on 
modelling an agent's utility-maximizing demand function for assets (both 
financial and non-financial). The supply side is almost considered as passively 
responding to the needs of the market. 
Still, although, for example, the growth in the supply of near-monies, 
derivatives, and other "exotic" financial instruments may be seen as largely the 
response of profit maximizing firms to the needs of asset consumers, the role of 
lower transactions costs (ie. improved technology) and a more accommodating 
15 In a somewhat less sophisticated manner, a similar situation 
exists in many of the transition economies, often with large 
negative repercussions for stabilization policy. As Levine and 
Scott (1993) argue, firms lend to their suppliers in order to keep 
them viable as there are no other obvious sources of inputs. 
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institutional and legal environment in this process cannot be ignored.16 
In the LDC context, a number of avenues present themselves. One would be 
to suggest that despite liberalization, the immediate research issue in LDCs is 
not the control of a dizzying spiral of assets, as the expansion is likely to be 
within "conventional" limits of customer needs and choice. A second would be to 
argue that when it comes to asset supply, LDCs are "takers" of the wide array of 
existing types of assets, which, in a deregulated and global environment, will 
present themselves as the need arises. That is, there is no particular aspect 
to asset supply in LDCs which cannot be covered by the available stock of assets 
that are known to market participants. Both of these points suggest that the 
research issue, if any, is simply to acknowledge the existence of a pool of 
assets in the international financial market place, from which LDCs may draw, and 
that, perhaps, the regulatory aspects of this flow might merit some attention. 
A third, and more pro-active, approach would be to argue that the 
interaction between LDC needs in a deregulated environment and the international 
supply of assets does, indeed, merit considerable attention, not only on the 
regulatory side, but also on the matter of the mix of types of finance that 
emerge in a post-liberalization environment, and the process by which types of 
assets are either "created" indigenously, or imported, for domestic use. 
Finally, the role of the market for government bonds during financial 
development and liberalization should be flagged. A wide market for government 
bonds plays a crucial role in providing signals to the rest of the financial 
markets. Specifically, the existence of a strong market for government bonds 
helps to provide a term-structure of interest rates which acts as a frame of 
reference for the private sector. For example, in the U.S., the benchmark for 
long term interest rates is the thirty-year government bond rate and for the 
short term the treasury bill rate. If the market for government bonds is thin 
and/or weak, the markets signals sent to the rest of the financial sector will 
also be weak and unreliable. This raises the level of uncertainty in the trade 
of financial instruments. Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, it is very 
difficult to conceive of the CAPM without the "risk-free" rate provided by 
government bonds." 
Another, and wholly different strand of thinking will be briefly mentioned 
here. The increase in the availability and use of assets potentially makes the 
job of controlling monetary aggregates more complex. This issue is taken up in 
the next section, on central banks and financial liberalization. 
16 See, for example, Rose (1993) and Financial Times (1993) for 
accounts of the overall environment within which the explosive 
growth in the number of financial instruments has flourished. 
17 We owe this point to Jose Fanelli. 
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In any case, these are practical or empirical matters, and theory has 
little to say about these issues. 
IIIb. The Demand For Assets 
This topic has a long lineage in the literature. A brief overview would 
cover the existence of a simple form of "money" in the agent's choice set, to 
more sophisticated elaborations of this set. Thus the set may be expanded to 
include more forms of "money", in which different assets embody the 
characteristics of transactions and speculative motives of holding them to 
varying degrees. The set may be further expanded to include non-financial 
assets, including land, and human capital. Finally, the story may be completed 
with the explicit inclusion of uncertainty, transactions costs and a dynamic 
setting, to bring us to current perceptions of asset market and portfolio 
equilibrium. 
Surveys of developments in the area of asset markets and the demand for 
money may be found in Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), 
Barro and Fischer (1976), and Hakansson (1987). 
Starting with the Fisher Identity (MV = PT), and the seminal work of Hicks 
and Keynes1B, the classic view of money demand as encompassing a transactions, 
precautionary, and speculative motive still prevails, albeit with substantial 
refinements in each branch. 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) pioneered the inventory approach to money 
demand. Its emphasis on transactions ("shoe leather") costs and economies of 
scale has significant empirical implications if, in fact, financial 
liberalization can be linked to changes in the relevant technology in the 
financial sector, and therefore, to changes in transactions costs as defined in 
the Baumol-Tobin framework. Miller and Orr's (1966) re-working of the Baumol- 
Tobin approach is seen by Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) as being "extremely useful 
for analyzing the consequences of innovation in cash management techniques" (p. 
309). 
The standard contemporary references for viewing money as one element in 
a more general portfolio equilibrium are Tobin (1958) and Friedman (1956). 
Extensions to this approach may be broadly classified as follows. 
Ando and Shell (1975), Fama and Farber (1979), Brunner and Meltzer (1971), 
and King and Plosser (1986) incorporate uncertainty into the basic framework. 
Wallace's (1980) overlapping generations approach has proved to be problematic, 
18 For the record, see Hicks (1935 and 1939) and Keynes (1930 
and 1936). 
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as has the cash-in-advance approach attributed to Lucas (1980) and Svensson 
(1985). 
In any case, the theoretical developments in this area, along with the 
financial deregulation and innovation in, primarily, the U.S., in the late 1970s 
spawned a growth industry in more and more complex techniques of empirically 
testing the validity of the various theoretical hypotheses. This literature is 
reviewed in Goldfeld (1987) and Goldfeld and Sichel (1990). Leaving aside the 
very detailed and complex empirical formulations contained in this body of work 
(which, in any case, is constrained by data availability in most countries), 
attention should be paid to the literature on whether money demand becomes 
unstable and unpredictable in the face of developments in the financial sector. 
Finally, as the range of financial assets available to agents increases, 
the degree of "moneyness" embodied in each varies to the point that traditional 
notions of what is or is not money (and whether or how it's supply should be 
regulated) inevitably lead to the Divisia literature, a la Barnett (1980) and 
Spindt (1985), where monetary aggregates are broken down into weighted 
components. The implications for policy of the notion that simple aggregation 
of components gives a misleading notion of money supply are many, and have not 
been fully explored, particularly in the LDC context.19 
Clearly, many and large swaths of the literature on money and finance have 
been condensed into a few salient strands, in the preceding paragraphs. It seems 
appropriate that the determining factors on what should or should not be examined 
in this project should be [a] the link with an actual or potential financial 
liberalization, [b] policy relevance, for an LDC, and [c] data availability. 
IIIc. Financial Intermediation 
Financial intermediation may be considered the gamut of institutional 
arrangements within which savers interact with borrowers, thereby creating 
equilibrium in the financial sector. A principal determinant of the size and 
scope of the financial intermediation sector is transactions costs, which, in 
turn, may be said to be driven by improvements in communications and other 
technology, and legal impediments to trade in financial instruments. While 
changes in the relevant technological parameters, particularly in LDCs, may be 
assumed to be "exogenous" (or readily importable), the legal and institutional 
financial environment is directly related to the nature of the financial 
liberalization. 
19 An exception is Dhliwayo (1992). For a recent survey see 
Ford et al (1992). 
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The impact of financial deregulation and innovation on monetary policy in 
the North American context has been alluded to already. The literature in 
finance considers a number of related issues, which are surveyed in Merton 
(1990). 
First, while the theoretical literature derives conditions under which new 
financial instruments will be created (essentially, to help agents diversify 
risk), in practice, the interaction in LDCs between customers and financial 
firms, and the institutional environment within which they operate, may shed 
light on the process of financial market deepening and widening. How are new 
instruments created? What are the links between market structure and 
transactions costs? Should a financial liberalization consciously target 
intermediaries for "infant industry" nurturing, to promote indigenous market 
development, or will this come about from market forces alone? 
Special attention should be made to the overall approach to creating 
financial markets and intermediaries in LDCs. Should the Anglo-Saxon model of 
equity-based financial systems be encouraged, or should the German and Japanese 
bank-based models be encouraged? Singh's (1993) survey comes out in favour of 
the bank-based model, but the more general lesson here is that particular 
conditions in the country in question should determine the ultimate prescription, 
not a general statement of principle of the intrinsic superiority of one model 
over the other. 
Second, there is a large literature on the potential destabilizing impact 
of "far too advanced" technology in the financial sector. Witness, for example, 
the debate over the role of program trading and derivatives in market 
instability, covered in Part 2 of Miller (1991). Few, if any, LDC financial 
sectors have reached the "sophistication" of the North American or Western 
European bourses, but similar questions, adapted to local conditions, may 
usefully be raised. 
In the case of LDCs, where financial sectors are still relatively 
underdeveloped, an additional issue arises. If there is an asymmetry among the 
key players, then the potential for destabilization exists. One example is the 
impact on exchange rates and reserves when capital is more mobile internationally 
than it is within a country. This can and does happen when the domestic 
financial system is not as well developed or integrated as one or a few national 
financial centres are with the international financial system. 
Such a scenario has two likely implications. The first is if the 
inefficiency of the domestic recording and other back office functions allows 
some agents to take advantage, either legally or illegally, of the slowness of 
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the System. 20 
The second is if the imbalance between international and intra-national funds 
movement makes exchange rates and reserves more unstable than they would have 
been had the domestic adjustment mechanism been up to speed. 
An alternative formulation of the asymmetry would be when foreign banks or 
financial houses operating within an LDC have access to more advanced technology 
(or other means) than their domestic competitors. This has implications for the 
development of a domestic financial sector, and methods of industry regulation. 
Gurley and Shaw (1960) develop the analytical framework that is still used 
in examining the development and regulation of financial intermediaries. The 
behaviour of financial intermediaries and their choice of assets and liabilities 
is covered in Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (1980), while Tobin (1987) 
and Fry (1988, particularly chapter 10) contain useful discussions of the 
institutional and regulatory aspects of the financial intermediation sector. 
Eaton (1994) examines the conditions under which financial centres develop or 
exist. He finds that countries that "export intermediation services to the rest 
of the world" typically have lower inflation, deeper financial systems, less 
government revenue from seigniorage, and lower reserve money requirements than 
countries that do not contain banking centers. 
Finally, no account of the issues involved in financial intermediation in 
LDCs is complete without taking into consideration the existence and role of the 
informal financial sector. A good discussion may be found in Parts I and II of 
Coats and Khatkhate (1980). An attempt to reconcile traditional and structural 
views of the formal-informal sector dichotomy in LDCs in a theoretical framework 
of plausible intermediary behaviour may be found in Bencivenga and Smith (1992). 
IV. Central Banks and Financial Liberalization 
This section takes up three topics. First, the development of central 
banks is situated in the larger discussion of their evolving role through 
history, with particular reference to relations vis-a-vis the rest of the 
financial sector. Next, central banking and the process of financial 
liberalization is discussed in light of the literature on time consistent policy, 
and the central bank independence debate. Finally, the role of central banks, 
and the nature of their operations, in the specific context of LDCs - where 
20 This is one of the reasons given for the scandal in 1993 in 
the Indian financial system. 
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financial liberalization is often "forced", and conducted in the midst of 
globalization and capital market crisis - is discussed. 
IVa. A Historical Perspective 
Today, five broad functions may be attributed to a central bank. It is: 
[1] banker to the government; [2] banker to domestic financial institutions; [3] 
regulator of the domestic financial sector; [4] responsible for currency issue 
and management of international reserves; [5] responsible for the operation of 
monetary and credit policy. These, in turn, may be classified, in the manner of 
,Goodhart (1987), as "micro" (functions 1-3, but particularly 3) and "macro" 
(functions 4 and 5, especially 5).21 
However, this has not always been the case, and even today, significant 
exceptions arise, of which more below. 
The earliest central banks had the overriding objective on the part of the 
Crown of deriving, or gaining control over, the pecuniary benefits of money 
creation, that is, seigniorage.22 The macro issue of controlling money and 
credit was left largely to the viscitudes of specie flow and availability, and 
debasement. Once founded, the science and art of central banking evolved into 
what it is today. So long as some central banks, such as the Bank of England, 
remained in private hands, or had significant commercial banking functions, there 
was a competitive conflict of interest in such a bank also fulfilling a function 
of banker to or supervisor of the rest of the financial system, and in 
particular, the function of lender of last resort. 
As central banks took on the role of lenders of last resort, they brought 
to the fore the notion of "insurance", and this, in turn, raised the spectre of 
"moral hazard." That is, if commercial banks conducted their activities secure 
in the knowledge that all or a portion of their losses would be covered by the 
central bank, then the only effective guard against commercial banks who thus 
21 A sixth function, that of promotion of financial 
development, may be added in the case of LDCs. Rather than seeing 
this as belonging to either the "macro" or "micro" sphere, this may 
be considered more as an overarching aim that underlies all central 
banking operations in LDCs. 
22 The world's first "central" bank is generally considered to 
be the Swedish Riksbank (1668), followed by the better known and 
better studied Bank of England (1694). Besides Goodhart's (1987) 
concise account on the matter, more detailed analyses of the 
evolution of central banks is contained in Timberlake (1978), 
Sayers (1957), Bagehot (1873), Hawtrey (1932), and Smith (1936). 
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took undue risks (or worse) was to also vest in the central bank the relevant 
regulatory and supervisory powers. This also meant that central banks shed their 
commercial wings as they took on their insurance and policing powers. With the 
exception of the cogent and lively objections of the Free Banking school, this 
change in course for central banks was widely accepted in society." 
Interestingly, while Free Banking is not taken particularly seriously anymore 
(except in restricted circles), the notion that central banks should be divested 
of their regulatory and insurance responsibilities has gained much credence, as 
will be seen in the next sub-section. 
By and large, central banks in LDCs reflect the historical and related ties 
that have existed in the region and the outside. Moreover, the large majority 
of central banks, particularly in Asia and Africa, date to the period 1947-65, 
reflecting the time of independence from colonial or outside rule. Therefore, 
these central banks also reflect the "state of the art" and other mores 
prevailing at the time of their creation. Their evolution since then may have 
had an indigenous flavour, but these points may be noted here: unlike the long 
lineage and evolutionary nature of central banking in Europe and North America, 
central banking in LDCs has a rather compressed history that [a] "began" at a 
specific point in time and with explicitly received charters and 
responsibilities, and [b] having begun on the model of the metropole, has either 
evolved little, or evolved in response to crisis, or external advice, often 
pressure. 24 
In this respect, Collyns' analysis of central banking in LDCs is 
instructive. Besides the evident point about these central banks reflecting, 
until recently, historical imperatives and arrangements, they typically have 
"many" functions (with obvious repercussions on financial sector control and 
liberalization) because of [a] the shortage in many countries of the required 
technical expertise, and [b] the subsumption to the needs of "national 
development" of the various societal institutions and traditions. Both point to 
large and powerful central banks, given very many tasks, in a general environment 
of dirigisme. The gamut of controls, regulations, and distortions that have come 
to characterize many LDC financial sectors - all of which may fall under the 
broader implications of the moniker "financial repression" - and which financial 
23 For a flavour of the debate and case for Free Banking, see 
White (1984) and Dowd (1992). 
24 Historical accounts in the tradition of the European 
literature, of central banking in LDCs, are few. Some central 
banks, such as those in India and Nigeria, have commissioned 
studies of their development. Outside the former sterling orbit, 
Julienne's (1988) account of the early years of the franc zone 
stands out as being in the grand old tradition of monetary history. 
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liberalizations now have undone or are attempting to undo, should thus come as 
no surprise. 
Still, in terms of the work of this project, it would be instructive to 
examine, as case studies, the links between central banks, their creation and 
evolution, and their relationship with the rest of the financial sector, both 
through history, and in contemporary (ie. crisis and SAP) terms. A perspective 
in three broad regions - the sterling legacy, the franc zone, and the Latin 
American situation - would be interesting and, judging by the paucity of current 
such literature, unique. 
Collyns (1983) deconstructs LDC central banks into these groups: [a] 
transitional central banks; [b] supranational central banks; [c] central banking 
in currency enclaves; and [d] central banks in extremely open economies. 
From a first principles approach, one has to be clear on the rationale for 
a central bank in a particular country or region, keeping in mind the exigencies 
of the prevailing situation. Even if the medium-to-long term prognosis is one 
of near-perfect capital mobility and globalization of markets, it need not follow 
that Collyns' taxonomy has been superseded by his case [d]. 
For one, while his example of case [a] had to do with the transition from 
currency boards to nationally autonomous central banks, the current analog to 
such a transition would be the case of the countries of Indochina or Cuba, or 
even more appropriate to the currency board comparison, the countries of the 
former ruble zone. Similarly, the analog for currency enclaves could be 
countries that opt for a rigid and (reasonably) credible peg, as many Latin 
American countries, notably Argentina, have done. Nor is supranational central 
banking passe. Besides the obvious examples of the franc zone and the eastern 
caribbean (not to mention the EMS), it is likely that moves towards enhanced 
regional integration in many parts of the world would, at some point, have to 
involve, at least, harmonization of certain laws relating to banking, finance, 
and capital, and at most, regionally co-ordinated monetary policy. 
Whether central banking history as it pertains to financial liberalization 
should be seen in strict regional terms, or in a more functional or 
characteristics-based manner, is for the project planning group to determine. 
IVb. Time Consistency and Central Banking Independence 
The most important development in the contemporary practice of central 
banking is the emphasis on rational agents and credible policy. This section 
will not go into the intricacies of the huge literature on the rules versus 
discretion debate, save for citing the "standard" reference on time consistency, 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), and the relevant central bank independence 
literature. 
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The time consistency approach is more appealing that the debate on rules 
versus discretion because it makes a simple yet powerful observation - what 
matters is not whether rules are "superior" to discretion, but rather, whether 
a policy announcement, be it a rule or discretion, is credible. The most 
forthright manner in which a policy can be made credible is to couch it in an 
institutional environment whereby the policy announcement is "locked in", once 
made. In other words, a rule is meaningless if it can be easily altered; 
discretion may be particularly coherent if it is formulated in the right manner, 
by the right people. A policy announcement is made time consistent, then, if the 
costs of backtracking are high, and widely seen to be high, no matter whether 
such announcements follow a particular theme, or are discrete and individually 
disparate. 
In the context of the formulation of monetary policy, time consistency has 
been interpreted to mean that [a] the credibility of the monetary authorities 
matters more than whether or not they announce the adoption of "monetarist" or 
any other principles; and [b] this credibility is enhanced when the central bank 
is distanced from the rest of the machinery of government. 
Empirically, the success of independent central banks has been taken to 
mean low inflation rates, and, sometimes, low costs, in terms of lost output, of 
fighting inflation (ie. a more inelastic Phillips curve25). The weight of the 
empirical evidence is in favour of the central bank independence hypothesis, and 
this may be found in Grilli et al (1991), Cukierman et al (1992), Cukierman 
(1992), Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991), and Banaian et al (1983). 
Despite this, at the macro, inflation-output level, the debate is far from 
concluded, and this is not the place to delve into it. Suffice to say that a 
number of issues remain to be addressed: [a] do independent central banks bring 
about low inflation, or do societies pre-disposed to monetary discipline more 
easily accept independent central banks? [b] do we have a long enough track 
record and among enough countries to make a proper determination on the matter, 
and, related to this [c] does it follow that extending independence to central 
banks in a host of countries around the world will "result in" lower inflation 
rates ie. is independence either a necessary or a sufficient condition for 
success in the fight against elastic Phillips curves? 
The macro-level issue outlined above does impinge. on more sectoral and 
financial liberalization issues, but this has not received the same attention 
among researchers as the larger debate. Principally, two issues should be 
addressed. 
First, what are the links between successful financial liberalization and 
25 a la Lucas (1973) - that is, the more inelastic the Phillips 
curve, the smaller the rise in unemployment for a given reduction 
in inflation. 
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independent central banks? More generally, what constitutes time consistent 
policy when it comes to dismantling and rationalizing the apparatus of repressed 
financial sectors? Clearly, credibility in, say, de-nationalizing a banking 
system, or attracting funds into it, or improving the quality of its lending 
requires that the policy move be well announced and permanent. But is there more 
to it than that? What are the characteristics of the enabling environment within 
which successful financial liberalization occurs, and how does the central bank, 
independent or otherwise, fit into this schema? How important is the rate of 
inflation (and perhaps more importantly, its variability and predictability) 
before, during, and after a financial liberalization? 
Second, what is the interplay between extending a central bank's statutory 
independence, its actual independence, and its somewhat traditional role as 
regulator of and lender of last resort to the commercial financial system? The 
literature, even for the Fed and European countries, is mixed or silent on this 
matter.26 "Classic" contemporary statements on the need for and 
operationalization of central bank independence, such as Fair (1979) and Burns 
(1977), concentrate on distance from crovernment in their characterization of 
independence, and here, the nature of appointment and duration of term of senior 
management, or statutory objectives, for example, get much attention. 
Empirical measures of independence, too, concentrate on such criteria. 
Only Grilli et al (1991) explicitly consider "banking supervision not trusted to 
central bank, or central bank alone" as counting towards more independence. The 
logic here is as follows. By delegating supervision to a separate entity, and 
leaving solvency finance issues to a private and fully funded deposit insurance 
scheme, there is less pressure on a central bank to step in and "save" a bank or 
banks (ie. irate depositors) in crisis, by monetizing the losses, and thus 
violating a credit and inflation ceiling. 
But in LDCs, where even middle income depositors may be poor, and - as in 
Africa and Central America - increasing democratization makes governments 
particularly responsive to such public pressure, would divorcing central banks 
from their financial sector roles work? If so, how best to design a system of 
independent central bank, credible public supervisor, and actuarily sound 
insurance system? If not, what are the alternatives? What is to be learnt from 
the experience of the Southern Cone countries during the early 1980s, as well as 
26 One recent exception is Heller (1991), who argues in favour 
of a limited mandate for the central bank, in this regard. 
McCallum (1994) uses simulations of U.S. data from the 1970s and 
1980s to suggest that a central bank can adhere to a monetary policy rule while also fulfilling its function as a lender-of-last- 
resort. 
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more recent episodes in South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia?" More generally, 
how "chinese" are the walls in countries where the relevant supervision and 
insurance functions are entrusted to bodies other than the central bank? Is this 
a part and parcel of financial liberalization, and if so, should it be? 
Everywhere? 
IVc. The Money/Credit Process and Financial Liberalization 
To make a proper evaluation of financial liberalization, ultimately, the 
proverbial short and long runs, and the adjustment path from one state to the 
next, will have to be delineated. The evidence and discussion alluded to earlier 
in this paper strongly suggest that financial liberalization reduces distortions 
and rent seeking behaviour in the credit markets. The jury is likely still out 
on the larger and related questions - do liberal financial sectors foster 
financial development better than illiberal ones, or not; and, is some degree of 
dirigisme necessary to put in place the pre-conditions for financial development 
before it is best left to the forces of the market place to take over the process 
of widening and deepening? 
While the issue of financial development has some central banking 
overtones, this section deals with a separate point - how is the money and credit 
creation process, and more generally, the conduct of monetary policy, affected 
by financial liberalization? 
Two broad strands of thought should be distinguished here. The first is 
political economic, and derives from the "political business cycle" approach 
27 In this respect, the case of la Banque Centrale des Etats 
de 1'Afrique de 110uest, or BCEAO) is instructive. Using the 
criteria set forth in Grilli et al (1991), Medhora (1993b) finds 
the BCEAO to be very independent - easily in the top third of OECD 
country rankings, and likely the most statutorily independent 
central bank among those in LDCs through much of its history. 
While this did produce an enviable inflation performance until the 
early 1980s, the macro-economic problems of the BCEAO region are 
well known (culminating in the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 
January 1994), and most countries in its purview have had troubled 
financial sectors. The BCEAO is no longer solely responsible for 
the commercial financial system, but it remains to be seen how 
"chinese" the walls really are. For a discussion of recent 
financial sector crises, see Sundararajan and Balino (1991), which 
contains case studies of Argentina, Chile, The Philippines, 
Thailand, and Uruguay. Akydz (1993), in a survey that is on the 
whole sceptical of "doctrinaire" financial liberalization, comes 
out in favour of retaining control of several aspects of the 
financial sector, on prudential regulation grounds. 
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starting with Nordhaus (1975), and comprising, as notable'contributions, Frey and 
Schneider (1981), Waller (1989), Alesina (1989), Cukierman and Meltzer (1989),' 
and Roubini and Sachs (1989). The gist of this line of thought is that macro- 
economic aggregates are, not surprisingly, responsive to political and social 
institutions and changes in a country. One example has already been noted in the 
previous section - pressure to compensate the losers from a financial sector 
failure may affect credit targets, the degree of affectation depending on the 
degree of independence of the central bank and related bodies. 
In this section, one would simply add that the impetus for, and speed and 
nature of, the financial liberalization itself is endogenous to the political 
economy of a country, buffeted, to a greater or lesser extent, by external 
pressure for stabilization and adjustment. So, how financial liberalizations 
come about may be worth studying, in various cases. 
But from this, a second, and more technical matter arises. Simply put, how 
do the relevant money and credit multipliers behave during and after 
liberalization, and, particularly, as capital markets become globally or 
regionally integrated, and widen and deepen (ie. as the number and nature of 
financial instruments increases?) And how does this affect the conduct of 
monetary policy by the central bank, independent or otherwise? 
Brunner (1987) states: 
Money is still best defined in the classical tradition to refer to any 
object generally accepted and used as a medium of exchange. Financial 
innovations associated with technological or institutional changes do not 
modify this definition. They do change however the empirical counterpart 
of the definition and this requires intermittent changes in the 
measurement procedures for the nation's money supply. 
That said, it is not clear, except in very broad terms28, how changes brought 
about by financial liberalization affect the various monetary aggregates, as well 
as their components. Consider the most basic identity that links the activity 
of the central bank with "final" money creation: M = B(1 + c)/(r + c), where M 
is narrow money (currency + demand deposits), B is base or "high powered" money 
(currency + reserves), c is the currency deposit ratio, and r is the (actual) 
reserve ratio. 
More elaborate formulations of this identity may be found in Frost (1977) 
and Cagan (1965). But even at first blush, it is apparent that none of the 
28 And sometimes not even then. Brunner and Meltzer (1990) 
give the example of the U.S. in the 1970s, when the introduction of 
credit cards and other money substitutes was said to result in 
demand for conventional money (currency and demand deposits) going 
to zero, with monetary velocity approaching infinity. "Shortly 
after these predictions, monetary velocity declined." [p. 3581 
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components of the identity are impervious to change, as a financial system, 
suddenly or partially, by evolution or by fiat, changes. Freedman (1983) 
outlines and measures the impact of innovations in the Canadian financial sector 
during the 1970s on money demand and interest rates, and then, the feedback to 
money supply. A similar exercise for a liberalizing LDC could hold lessons for 
it, and others. 
Once it is established (or estimated) just which aggregates are likely to 
change during and after liberalization, and how (ie. what new financial assets 
are likely to be introduced), it remains to be determined how the central bank's 
open market operations are likely to be affected by the change. Finally, the 
issue of monetary control could then be addressed. 
Johannes and Rasche (1987) address this issue empirically, for the U.S. 
Their framework may be portrayed thus: degree of control = 1/V[M - M*], where the 
denominator signifies the variance of the forecast error for money, which is 
conditional on the choice of policy variables and the institutional regime. 
Essentially, they assume that the money base can be controlled by the central 
bank, but that the money multiplier is unstable, and outside the central bank's 
immediate control. By breaking the money multiplier into its constituents, and 
estimating a time-series model for each constituent, they build an estimated 
money multiplier, which they test for robustness. The estimate may then be used 
to forecast money supply in the economy, whose periodicity depends on that of the 
underlying available data. 
For the U.S. during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is found that there 
is no evidence to suggest that forecast errors increased during that period of 
financial deregulation and innovation, with one significant exception - the 
spring of 1980, when President Carter imposed credit controls. One might surmise 
from this that some forms of control or de-control, and the speed with which they 
are imposed, matter, when it comes to the activities of the central bank in 
making and implementing monetary policy. 
A similar study for a group of LDCs could yield useful results. The 
qualitative evidence for LDCs, although not huge, does exist, as in Caprio and 
Honchan (1991), World Bank (1989), Wong (1991), and Callier (1991). But the next 
step, to empirically and rigorously link financial liberalization (and resulting 
innovation) with the practical conduct of monetary policy in LDCs, has yet to be 
taken. 
To summarize the results of this section, a set of studies could: examine 
the history and evolution of financial sector regulations and structure (ie. why 
did they come to be what they were on the eve of liberalization); relate the 
enabling environment, particularly moves to make the central bank more 
independent, to the success or otherwise of the liberalization; and empirically 
link changes in the money creation process to the general conduct of monetary 
policy and central bank operations. 
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It remains to be determined whether each of these issues should be tackled 
for each case study, or whether a more dispersed approach should be taken. 
V. Conclusion 
This section brings together the discussion of the previous pages, and 
suggests several areas that could be explored in future research. The idea here 
is not to put a point on every detail of the project, whose scope is to be 
determined by the researchers themselves. Rather, questions, many of which have 
already been posed in earlier sections, will be raised which indicate future 
directions of research. 
The aim of this paper has been to discuss financial liberalization [a] in 
view of the experience of countries that have already gone some way in 
liberalizing their financial sectors, and [b] by situating the research issues 
in their theoretical and practical context. 
The theoretical context includes developments in our understanding of asset 
markets and how they work. In this paper, the practical context has largely been 
taken to mean the central banking and monetary policy milieu within which (and 
often by which) a financial liberalization is conducted. 
If there are just a few salient lessons to be learnt from the experience 
of financial liberalizations to date, they would have to include these two: [a] 
initial conditions (ie. level and state of the financial sector) matter, and [b] 
the overall macro-economic environment within which the financial liberalization 
occurs matters. The gist of the discussion of section II was that a country 
liberalizing under "southern cone" conditions is likely to have an experience 
quite different from that of a country under "sub-saharan African" or "transition 
economy" conditions. 
But what exactly characterizes each initial state, and, leaving aside 
somewhat bald geographic generalizations, what can we reasonably say about the 
path and/or state dependency of a financial liberalization once we have 
identified the characteristics of the starting point? How do, say, a stable 
macro-economic environment, well developed system of property rights, and 
relatively wide and deep pre-existing capital market stack up with respect to 
each other when it comes to assessing the chances of success of a given financial 
reform? Should the over-riding objective'in, say, financial reform in Benin or 
Vietnam or India be the development of a properly functioning system of 
institutions and property rights, increasing the availability of assets, putting 
in place a proper regulatory framework, or stabilizing other parts of the 
economy? 
Jose Fanelli points out that from an analytical point of view, there is 
very little literature on the sorts of dollarized or bi-monetary systems found 
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in many Latin American countries. The problem is analytically interesting 
because in addition to foreign assets, there exist three domestic assets instead 
of two (ie. money, domestic "peso" bonds, and dollarized domestic assets.) 
Several research issues present themselves in such a situation. For example, 
what are the effects on targets and instruments of monetary policy? Is it 
possible to have an "independent" monetary policy? Is the central bank's 
regulation of a dollarized system different from a traditional one? What are the 
effects on the process of asset creation? 
Whatever the answers to these and related questions, it is apparent that 
the supply and demand sides of asset markets do not function in isolation of each 
other or the global economy. While it is understood that the progress of 
financial liberalization involves a widening and deepening of capital markets, 
little is known about the process of asset accumulation and new asset creation. 
This issue is particularly important as financial markets in some well developed 
centres produce readily exportable types of assets which others may choose to 
import, rather than indigenously develop. In either case, the matter of 
regulation of asset creation and/or movements in an environment of falling 
transactions costs and (therefore) near-perfect capital mobility remains a policy 
issue in all countries. 
The subject of regulation, in turn, leads to the role of the central bank 
in modern economies. Section IV identified several questions that arise as 
economies reform and integrate themselves into global markets, central banks 
become independent, but the regulatory issues and potential problems do not 
diminish, only change in nature. 
Purely as an exercise in monetary history, it may be useful to examine the 
evolution of the role of one or a few central banks in their countries' financial 
development and regulation. But in countries where expertise relating to 
financial matters is limited, and demands for public institutions to be more 
responsive to the needs of large portions of society are growing, more work needs 
to be done on making central banks "independent", yet maintaining a sound 
regulatory regime for the financial sector, at the same time that public 
confidence in economic institutions is enhanced, not diminished. 
While central banks become accustomed to the exigencies of independence and 
transparency, they must also grapple with the nuts and bolts of making and 
running monetary policy. During a time of rapidly evolving monetary aggregates 
and market conditions, this is no easy task for central bankers, but fortunately 
for researchers, several issues arise, and the relevant literature is flagged in 
sections IIIb and, especially, IVc. . 
Caprio, in Caprio et al (forthcoming), introduces the book by stating that 
"financial sector reform is more of a process than an event" (p. iii). As such, 
then, there cannot be a "definitive" study of the issue, only contributions to 
our understanding of a clearly fluid situation. By delineating the parameters 
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of the project the way this paper has delineated them, we hope the end results 
add to our knowledge and understanding of this important and topical issue. 
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